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The Cost of Free Trade
Joel Richard Paul
Professor
University of California, Hastings Law School
The 2015 debate over President Obama’s free trade agreements illustrates 
two fundamental misconceptions about the character of globalization and the 
associated gains from trade. The first is the idea that the world is growing more 
economically interdependent and that this is without precedent in human his-
tory.1 Surely the profusion of abundantly available imported goods and services 
is evidence that the total volume of trade is increasing. This free movement of 
goods, services, and capital across national boundaries (what I will call “economic 
interdependence” or “globalization”) is made possible by lower costs of trans-
portation and telecommunications and the gradual liberalization of markets as 
countries negotiate reductions in tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and other nontariff 
barriers to trade. Thus, globalization appears to be a fact of life, and there is no 
choice but to continue the process of liberalizing markets if we wish to move 
forward.2 In the words of the former U.S. Trade Representative and World 
Bank President Robert Zoellick, “Globalization is akin to a force of nature.”3 
Globalization exerts an inexorable gravitational force, propelling us forward at 
an accelerating rate. This idea of what economic interdependence means is so 
deeply ingrained in our consciousness that it rarely merits critical examination.
The second misconception that free trade proponents in particular make 
is that free trade, like a rising tide, lifts all boats.4 Proponents of free trade argue 
that it will also reduce income inequality, both between and within countries.5 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that U.S. trade statutes, the entire structure 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the governing international rules 
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and regulations known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
are all premised on these gains from trade.
These two misconceptions—that globalization is unprecedented, acceler-
ating, and predetermined and that trade benefits everyone—form the central 
justifications for negotiating free trade agreements. In fact, there is little evidence 
to support either of these assumptions. When we begin to scrutinize them more 
closely, we find that their application leads to an international legal structure 
that routinely undermines national standards for protecting workers and the 
environment. I do not mean to suggest that international trade is a bad thing. 
In fact, under the right circumstances global trade can increase competition and 
give consumers a wider choice of goods and services at lower prices. Instead, I 
argue that it is possible to reform our trading system in order to both increase 
competition and raise regulatory standards to benefit developing as well as 
industrialized countries.
Is GlobalIzatIon PredetermIned?
The first set of questions to ask is whether globalization is increasing, and if 
so, whether this increase is natural, inexorable, and unprecedented. It is true 
that the volume of trade in goods and services has increased dramatically over 
the last two decades of liberalization—but is that evidence of greater economic 
interdependence or merely of greater prosperity? And regardless of the direc-
tion of globalization, is the process predetermined by exogenous factors, or is 
it contingent on national policies?
In order to answer these questions, one must first examine the degree of 
economic interdependence, or globalization, between nations. One method to 
determine that would be to look at what portion of a country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP)—the total value of all goods and services produced in a year—is 
represented by imports or exports. If the proportion of imports and exports rela-
tive to a nation’s overall economic output grows over time, this would indicate 
that a country’s dependence on foreign trade is increasing.
Figure 1 represents the total value of world trade as a proportion of world 
GDP from 1960 to 2013. As expected, the rising slope of the graph since the 
creation of the WTO in the 1990s confirms the assumption that the world 
economy as a whole is becoming more dependent on trade. 
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Figure 1
This observation is even more dramatically demonstrated by Figure 2, which 
represents the total value of imports and exports as a proportion of the GDP 
for China. Before the opening of China in the 1970s, the Chinese economy 
was completely centralized; it was owned and operated by the state and unable 
to compete in world markets. Beginning in the 1970s, the rapidly rising slope 
of Figure 2 depicts China’s increased dependence on trade. This slope grows 
steeper after 2001, the year in which China joined the WTO. In short, this 
graph confirms the general impression of increasing economic interdependence. 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 represents the total value of imports and exports as a proportion of 
India’s GDP. India had a highly protected domestic market through the 1980s. 
Here again, we see a rapid increase in the degree of economic integration; during 
this period, India lowered smaller tariff and nontariff barriers, reduced subsidies, 
welcomed foreign investment, and privatized state-owned industries. 
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But what is true for China, India, and the world as a whole is not necessarily 
true for every country. In the United States, for example, trade as a proportion 
of GDP has risen and fallen many times over the nation’s history, as Figure 4 
shows. In 2014, the total value of U.S. exports and imports was slightly more 
than 25 percent of total GDP. By contrast, circa 1806, imports and exports 
totaled nearly 45 percent of total GDP based on U.S. Commerce Department 
estimates. This is not surprising when one considers that in the early nineteenth 
century, the United States, like many developing countries today, depended on 
selling raw materials for manufactured imports. The peaks and valleys on this 
graph represent changes in the U.S. economy and trade policy. 
Figure 4 
While many developing or recently industrialized countries such as India 
share a graph similar to China’s, most mature economies more closely resemble 
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the United States’ graph. For example, Figure 5 shows the total value of imports 
and exports for the United Kingdom as a proportion of its GDP. We are ac-
customed to thinking of the United Kingdom as one of the world’s most open 
economies and a major player in world trade throughout modern history. In fact, 
the country’s degree of economic interdependence has shifted radically over time, 
often in response to specific government policies and global economic events. 
Trade today is as important a component of the United Kingdom’s GDP as it 
was during the 1920s, when the country was regaining its economic strength 
following the devastation caused by World War I.
Figure 5 
Figure 6 tracks Japan’s economic interdependence from the 1930s to the 
present. It shows that Japan’s economy was far more interdependent before 
World War II than it is today, even though we are accustomed to thinking of 
Japan as another major trading power.
Figure 6 
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What these graphs suggest is that the upward trend in total world trade as 
a percentage of the world’s GDP is due largely to the liberalization of China and 
India, two of the world’s largest economies. But that trend does not necessarily 
hold true for most other countries—even leading market economies such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. By examining these graphs, we 
can infer that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the long-term rise in 
interdependence. Rather, economic interdependence is a historically contingent 
process that rises and falls, reflecting changes in global economic conditions 
and the specific policies of individual countries. While technological changes 
in telecommunications and transportation have increased the opportunity 
for trade, these graphs demonstrate that the flow of goods and services is not 
necessarily increasing as a proportion of most countries’ GDP.6 In other words, 
contemporary globalization is not predetermined. Once we discard the idea that 
globalization is predetermined, we can unmask the underlying policy trade-offs 
that proponents of these agreements do not acknowledge: Free trade has both 
positive and negative consequences for our economy and our environment. 
the GaIns from free trade
Proponents of free trade agreements—such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) between 11 Pacific Rim countries and the European Union’s Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—argue that free trade benefits ev-
eryone.7 This argument, of course, derives from the nineteenth century–theory 
of comparative advantage, which, as first proposed by David Ricardo in 1817, 
holds that if in the absence of trade relative prices differ between two perfectly 
competitive market economies, then both sides will gain and neither will lose 
by trading at an intermediate world price.8 The theory predicts that in the near 
term, free trade will both lower prices for consumers and increase total world-
wide production by encouraging countries to specialize in the production of 
goods and services in which they enjoy a 
comparative advantage. This prediction 
rests on the assumption that prices reflect 
the actual cost of production, so that a 
country with the lowest relative price of 
producing a particular good is presumed to have a comparative advantage in 
producing that good. This assumption only holds true in a perfectly competitive 
market where sellers must compete by cutting their prices to the lowest level they 
can afford while still covering their costs. In the absence of perfect competition, 
Economic interdependence 
i s  a  h istor ica l ly  cont igent 
process that rises and falls.
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the price of a good may be significantly higher than the actual cost of produc-
tion, and the market will have no way to determine a country’s comparative 
advantage. In that case, free trade will not necessarily lead to near-term gains.
Perfect competition requires four conditions: there must be many buyers 
and sellers so that no one of them can control prices; goods must be homoge-
neous or easily substitutable so that consumers will select goods based solely on 
price rather than based on where the good is produced or who sells it; there can 
be no barriers to other potential competitors entering the market; and everyone 
must have perfect knowledge of who sells what at the best price.
Obviously, the vast majority of goods and services traded on world mar-
kets today are not traded in anything remotely resembling perfect competition. 
Monopolies, oligopolies, cartels, state-trading enterprises, and parastatal orga-
nizations dominate the markets for a large proportion of goods and services. 
Most consumer goods and services, including pharmaceuticals, automobiles, 
electronics, clothing, films, music, medical care, and software, are not homog-
enous. They are protected by intellectual property rights that prevent genuine 
competition. Furthermore, advertisers spend billions to convince consumers that 
their products can be differentiated from those of their competitors. Professional 
licensing, educational qualifications, regulations, patents, and capital require-
ments all operate as barriers to entry for many fields, including professional 
services, banking, insurance, transportation, and heavy manufacturing. Finally, 
the sheer size and complexity of markets makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine who is selling what at the best price.
Without perfectly competitive markets, the price signal mechanism does 
not work effectively. As a result, trade does not necessarily lead to a more effi-
cient allocation of productive resources and an increase in wealth worldwide. In 
fact, trade can exacerbate distortions in domestic economies, making countries 
worse off than they would otherwise be in the absence of trade. This insight is 
neither original nor controversial among mainstream economists, but somehow 
political elites have ignored the economic literature questioning the applicability 
of the theory of comparative advantage.9
the sunk Costs of free trade 
Against these gains from free trade, we have to consider its costs. Import com-
petition can drive domestic industries out of business. Free traders would argue 
that if more cost-efficient textile factories overseas outcompete the U.S. textile 
industry, U.S. workers and capital tethered to the less efficient industry will be 
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free to move to other more productive industries, like computer software. The 
result, by this logic, is a net gain in world production. This is what the Austrian 
economist Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.”10
Of course, in the real world, productive resources do not all shift smoothly 
from one industry to another. Mechanical looms cannot produce computer 
software, and workers who have spent 20 or 30 years weaving and dying textiles 
lack the qualifications for computer engineering. Factories and equipment are 
abandoned; unemployed workers lose self-esteem; families suffer; governments 
incur more expenses administering unemployment benefits and social welfare; 
economic stress causes illness, divorce, addiction, and delinquency; crime soars, 
tax revenues plummet, and whole communities, like the once prosperous city 
of Detroit, suffer the consequences.
We cannot determine a priori whether the near-term gains from trade 
exceed the sunk costs. Most economic studies indicate that the near-term gains 
to an industrialized economy from a free trade agreement are relatively small, 
perhaps on the order of 0.1–1.5 percent of GDP.11 For example, one recent study 
estimated that the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership would increase U.S. GDP 
by only 0.13 percent.12 Another study, prepared for the European Commission, 
found that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would yield 
about a 0.60 percent growth in GDP for both the EU and the United States.13 
These gains are so marginal that they are easily obscured by other factors: for 
example, a growth rate of 0.60 percent may result from shifts in interest rates or 
bad weather.14 Moreover, any estimates of the gains from increasingly liberalized 
trade are based on econometric models, which often depend on inadequate data 
and fluctuating assumptions, especially in the service sector, which comprises 
the largest component of U.S. exports.15
Near-term gains from trade of less than 1 percent may not be sufficient to 
compensate for sunk costs. Over the long run, the spur of foreign competition, 
the growth of economies of scale due to access to export markets, and the range 
of consumer choices may create what economists call “dynamic gains” from 
trade—gains that probably will exceed the sunk costs. But these dynamic gains 
are difficult to measure and do not necessarily accrue to those whose wages and 
communities suffer from import competition. Long-run gains may be significant, 
but as Keynes reminded us, “in the long run we are all dead.”16
the ImPaCt of free trade on Workers
U.S. labor unions generally oppose free trade agreements out of fear that U.S. 
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workers cannot compete against the low wages and working conditions of 
foreign workers. The average hourly compensation earned by a U.S. worker in 
manufacturing in 2012 was $35.53. By comparison, the average wage paid to 
manufacturing workers in Mexico was $6.48; in the Philippines, $2.01; in China, 
$1.36; and in India, $1.17.17 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
United States lost around six million manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2009, 
and more than 42,000 U.S. factories closed in that same time span.18 Some of 
these jobs were lost to the recession, but most moved overseas. According to 
one study, the United States lost 2.7 million jobs to Chinese imports between 
2001 and 2010—that represents more than 2 percent of total U.S. workers.19
Not all U.S. job losses 
represent a corresponding gain 
for workers in Asia or Latin 
America. Some U.S. jobs are 
replaced by jobs elsewhere, but 
foreign factories and foreign workers may be more or less productive, such that 
the number of jobs created elsewhere is not necessarily equal to the number of 
jobs lost. Still, no one doubts that globalization has generated millions of overseas 
jobs in developing economies. These are primarily manufacturing jobs in cities 
that usually pay higher salaries than agriculture or mining jobs do. Young people 
from rural areas flock to these jobs, attracted by the wages and the chance to 
escape the traditional confines of rural life.20 But these new industries generate 
social costs as well.
Most developing countries lack the rudimentary infrastructure and rule 
of law necessary to regulate and enforce basic labor, safety, and environmental 
standards. Industrialization and urbanization uproot traditional family life. 
Workers are often forced to live and work in dangerous and degrading condi-
tions. Factory managers often prefer to hire women and children, whom they 
view as more compliant.21
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there are at 
least 168 million children between the ages of 4 and 17 employed worldwide, 
85 million of whom have hazardous jobs. In Asia, Latin America, the Middle 
East, and North Africa, more than 9 percent of children work. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, the figure is as high as 21 percent.22 These workers are especially vulner-
able to exploitation and sexual harassment. Long hours and repetitive motion 
cause injuries: eyesight suffers, respiratory diseases occur, muscle coordination 
fails. These workers have short work lives and no social safety nets when they 
are discarded by their employers.
In Asia, Latin America, the Middle 
East, and North Africa, more 
than 9 percent of children work.
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The wages paid to manufacturing workers in most developing countries are 
insufficient to support a family. Most surprisingly, over the last decade, prevailing 
wages as a percentage of living wages have not increased in most of the develop-
ing countries that are leading exporters to the United States. Figure 7 lists 15 
of the leading exporters of clothing to the United States and the median wages 
of workers as a percentage of the living wage. It shows that in major apparel-
exporting countries such as Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Thailand, actual wages have declined as a 
percentage of the living wage. In other major exporters, including Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, and Vietnam, wages barely increased and 
were less than 50 percent of a living wage in 2011.23 Developing countries do 
not raise minimum wages because they fear capital would then move to other 
developing countries that have lower wages. Developing countries must compete 
for capital investment and jobs, and this competition leads countries to lower 
their labor standards in a self-destructive “race to the bottom.”
Proponents of free trade argue that globalization is a rising tide that lifts all 
boats, reducing poverty and closing the gap between rich and poor countries. In 
fact, the last three decades have witnessed rising income inequality both within 
and between nation-states.24 In the United States, for example, record corpo-
rate profits and soaring productivity have been accompanied by a more than 
12 percent decline in the median income of working households from 2000 to 
2011.25 One standard measurement for income equality, the Gini coefficient, 
measures the extent to which the distribution of individuals’ income deviates 
from perfect equality. The higher the Gini coefficient, the larger the disparity 
of income. Figure 8 tracks the Gini coefficient over the period from 1984 to 
2012 for four major trading countries: China, India, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. The graph demonstrates that inequality rose during this period 
significantly. China, in particular, had one of the highest Gini coefficients ever 
recorded as income for the very rich soared. 
Paul_LAYOT.indd   10 12/6/15   11:19 PM
The Cost of Free Trade
Fall/Winter 2015 • volume xxii, issue 1
11
Figure 8
Trade growth contributes to growing income disparity in complex ways. 
First, only some workers in select industries participate in the global economy, 
and competition from other low-wage countries forces managers to hold down 
wages even in export industries. Second, the global economy disproportionately 
rewards workers who have access to the latest technology, foreign language abil-
ity, and education. High-skilled professional services reap the most benefit from 
trade.26 Those at the very top of their profession—lawyers, bankers, doctors, 
athletes, musicians, and actors—can now reach a global market. Globalization 
has produced a “winner-take-all society,” rewarding the people at the top of their 
respective field with enormous wealth.27 Third, as manufacturing jobs in high-
wage countries move to foreign countries, displaced workers are often pushed 
into nonunion service jobs that command lower salaries. Fourth, industries in 
developing countries that depend on the export of generic products, like agri-
culture, fish, minerals, basic steel, or yarn, face intense competition and high 
price volatility. By contrast, industries in industrialized countries that produce 
more advanced manufactured goods use patents and copyrights to prevent 
competitors from producing identical products. As a result, these types of goods 
face less competition than generic commodities, and therefore their prices tend 
to remain stable or increase over time. Fifth, as countries globalize, investors 
seek to reduce their political risk in foreign countries by buying influence, what 
economists call “rent-seeking behavior.” In the United States rent seeking usually 
involves paying lobbyists and making campaign contributions; in developing 
countries rent seeking means paying illegal bribes. Rent seeking also contributes 
to greater income inequality as local government officials and foreign investors 
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share the profits. Finally, one of the benefits of globalization has been a reduc-
tion in child mortality rates and a longer life span among the rural poor, along 
with an increase in the use of birth control among the urban elite. The result is 
that the population growth in many developing countries is skewed toward the 
more rural poor. This, too, contributes to the growing disparity of income.28
Economists would argue that the gains from trade could be redistributed 
through income taxes. However, the same institutions that promote open mar-
kets, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also promote 
lower taxes.29 In both developing and industrialized countries, the trend over 
the last three decades has been toward lower income taxes.30 During this period, 
the pressure for market liberalization has led to regressive tax reform in many 
countries, reinforcing the trend towards greater inequality.31 
envIronmental Costs 
Globalization affects more than working conditions and incomes. The growth 
in consumption and transportation depletes natural resources and increases 
carbon emissions. If a factory produces toxic byproducts that pollute the air or 
the water, those costs fall on the public rather than on the producer. Economists 
would say that these are “external social costs.” When the government requires 
the plant to clean up the damage or use technologies to reduce pollution, it 
forces producers to internalize these external social costs. Producers typically 
pass the added cost of regulation on to consumers, so that the price of their 
products more accurately reflects the true total cost of production. Consumers 
can choose to pay the higher price, buy a cheaper cleaner substitute, or reduce 
their consumption.
By forcing industries to internalize the real environmental costs of pro-
duction, the government protects envi-
ronmental values. However, in raising 
the price of a domestic product, the 
government also implicitly confers a cost 
advantage on foreign competitors who 
are not subject to the same regulatory 
burden. For example, in the United States, the cost of operating pollution control 
equipment necessary to comply with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air 
Act added 5 percent to steel production costs or about $10–20 per ton.32 If the 
Chinese steel industry had to meet the same environmental standards as U.S. 
U.S.  environmental  regula-
tions in effect have conferred 
a comparative advantage on 
C h i n e s e  s t e e l  p r o d u c e r s .
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steel companies, it would have cost Chinese companies more than $1.7 billion 
in 2006.33 The point is that Chinese steel producers do not have to meet the 
same rigorous environmental standards, so Chinese steel is dirtier and cheaper 
to produce than U.S. steel. U.S. environmental regulations in effect have con-
ferred a comparative advantage on Chinese steel producers, but this is not the 
kind of comparative advantage that the theory envisioned. Rather, it is a kind 
of constructed comparative advantage that distorts the pattern of trade. When 
U.S. consumers purchase Chinese rather than U.S. steel, the environmental cost 
of producing that steel falls on everyone who breathes. Chinese steel producers 
have no incentive to reduce their pollution given the diffuse nature of its costs.
Naturally, U.S. producers complain that regulatory costs disadvantage 
them in international trade. As we lower trade barriers, U.S. producers have the 
opportunity to relocate production to countries with less regulation. U.S. steel 
producers may find that it is less expensive to move plants to Latin America 
and ship their product back to the United States than it is to comply with U.S. 
environmental standards. When capital goes abroad, the United States loses 
jobs and tax revenues. This risk puts pressure on U.S. regulators to reduce the 
regulatory burden on U.S. producers. Throughout the world, regulatory au-
thorities may be forced to lower environmental standards in order to compete 
in attracting and retaining capital investment. Regulatory competition leads, 
once again, to a race to the bottom.34
the Problem of soCIal dumPInG 
Social dumping occurs when a country exports goods without requiring pro-
ducers to internalize the social costs of production. When countries with low 
labor and environmental standards export goods to a country such as the United 
States, they pose a threat to the importing country’s own labor and environmental 
standards. For two decades, the United States tried to address social dumping 
in its free trade agreements (FTAs) by adding labor and environmental side 
agreements. Experience has shown, however, that these side agreements are not 
enforced, and labor and environmental standards have not improved in coun-
tries that have FTAs with the United States.35 By not internalizing social costs, 
exporting countries are in effect subsidizing their exporters, distorting the price 
of their exports, and shipping their social problems overseas.
Generally, when countries export goods at unfair prices, importing coun-
tries have the right to levy antidumping duties that are designed to raise the price 
of the import to a fair price or “normal value.” In the United States, for example, 
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the Department of Commerce (Commerce) determines the margin of dumping 
by assessing what the normal value of an import should be based on a complex 
set of statutory calculations. If Commerce finds that there is dumping, it can 
impose an antidumping duty to raise the actual price of the import to the normal 
value.36 The purpose of the antidumping duty is to prevent foreign exporters 
from gaining an unfair advantage at the expense of domestic producers. Many 
economists criticize these measures because they can discourage competition 
and may not be necessary; the same purpose could be achieved more directly by 
applying our antitrust laws.37 Nevertheless, antidumping duties have been part 
of U.S. trade law for nearly a century, and all the member states of the WTO 
apply antidumping duties pursuant to the relevant provisions of GATT.38
There are various technical methods for determining normal value depend-
ing upon the circumstances. Commerce frequently determines the normal value 
by calculating what it would cost to produce that good in the exporting coun-
try. In such cases, there are many considerations that Commerce must weigh. 
Among other production costs, Commerce must determine the cost of labor in 
the foreign market. Typically, Commerce would survey the wages in a particular 
industry to make that calculation. But what if workers are exploited; if they are 
denied the right to organize or bargain collectively; if producers rely on children, 
prisoners, or slave labor; or if workers are forced to work in unconscionable 
conditions? In such cases, should Commerce apply an unfair wage, or should 
it consider what the cost of labor would be assuming workers were paid a fair 
wage? Under current law, Commerce does not consider whether wages are fair. 
But if instead Commerce imputed a fair wage in calculating the normal value, 
then the resulting antidumping duty would counter the effect of social dumping. 
level the PlayInG fIeld In trade aGreements aCt
U.S. Senate Bill 735, the Level the Playing Field in Trade Agreements Act 
(Level the Playing Field Act) introduced by Senators Jeff Merkley of Oregon 
and Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin, would require the President to negotiate 
with trade partners in the TPP and TTIP for a change in the determination of 
the normal value in antidumping proceedings.39 The Level the Playing Field 
Act would authorize Commerce to estimate the normal value based upon the 
assumption that a producer should pay workers an “adequate wage” and should 
maintain “sustainable production methods.” While the current antidumping law 
only permits Commerce to estimate the normal value based on actual wages and 
does not consider environmental costs, the proposed legislation would require 
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Commerce to take into account the social costs of exploited workers and envi-
ronmental degradation. An “adequate wage” is defined as one sufficient to meet 
basic needs of workers and their dependents. “Sustainable production methods” 
are defined to include technologies and methods necessary to provide for worker 
safety, conserve energy and natural resources, and control pollution and toxic 
waste. If exports were produced 
without meeting those standards, 
Commerce could impose an anti-
dumping duty equal to the differ-
ence between the actual price of 
the import and the price the good 
would have cost if it had complied. 
Of course, this provision would be 
reciprocal, so that other states could impose the same standards on U.S. exports. 
In effect, the Act would impose an “anti–social dumping duty” on imports that 
failed to meet these minimal labor and environmental standards.
How would Commerce go about determining an adequate wage or the cost 
of sustainable production methods? Adequate wages vary in different countries 
depending on living standards. An “adequate wage” should allow a couple earning 
two wages with two dependents to earn at least enough to provide food, shelter, 
clothing, education, medical care, and retirement savings for their household. 
Initially, each country would decide for itself what wage was adequate based 
on the cost of living in that country. Similarly, each country could decide for 
itself the most appropriate technologies and methods for meeting sustainable 
standards of safety and environmental protection. To avoid uncertainty about 
pricing, exporters could request pre-certification from Commerce stating that 
they have met the requirements for adequate wages and sustainable production 
methods. Although the Act does not address this issue, there should be an ap-
peals process for Commerce’s determination of these values before a bi-national 
panel in order to resolve any conflicts.
If Commerce had the authority to impose a duty against social dumping, 
it would give exporters an incentive to raise labor and environmental standards. 
Different countries might find different methods for raising environmental 
standards depending on available technologies, infrastructure, and the standard 
of living. Admittedly, it may be that some production is so inherently toxic to 
the environment that many products should not be manufactured in countries 
that lack basic technology and infrastructure. From an economic perspective 
that is the same as saying that a country does not have a comparative advantage 
If Commerce had the authority 
to impose a duty against social 
dumping, it would give exporters 
an incentive to raise labor and 
e nv i ro n m e nt a l  s t a n d a rd s.
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in producing that good.
If every country’s exports were subject to these minimum standards for 
wages and sustainability as a condition for entering the U.S. market, there would 
be no race to the bottom. Wage rates would vary in different countries, but 
wages overseas would rise, and the wage differential between U.S. and foreign 
workers would narrow. It might be that under the TTIP, the EU would require 
the United States to raise wages to an adequate level in some export industries as 
well. Rather than trading on an artificially constructed comparative advantage, 
exporting countries would rely on other sources of comparative advantage. For 
example, it may be that if agricultural workers in the United States were paid fair 
wages, certain handpicked crops such as blueberries would not be economical 
to produce in the United States.
Would an antI–soCIal dumPInG duty be ConsIstent WIth Gatt?
GATT Article II prohibits any member of the WTO from raising tariffs above 
the rate negotiated by the parties. Article VI allows members to impose an ad-
ditional tariff equal to the margin of dumping, but that is strictly limited by the 
Agreement on Article VI, which defines the terms for calculating antidumping 
duties. That agreement probably would not permit countries to impose addi-
tional duties against social dumping. However, an anti–social dumping duty 
could be legally permitted if it were attached to a free trade agreement such as 
the TPP or the TTIP. Under Article 24 of the GATT, members of the WTO 
are permitted to form free trade agreements like NAFTA or TTIP. Within a 
free trade area, states can generally write their own rules for eliminating barriers 
to trade as long as their external tariffs with countries outside of the free trade 
area remain unchanged.
There are two arguments against levying an antidumping duty on social 
dumping. First, opponents argue that doing so will raise prices for U.S. consum-
ers. In fact, the cost of labor is not a significant component of the cost of most 
imports. For example, labor costs, including post-production costs for shipping 
and retail services, typically represent less than 2 or 3 percent of the cost of 
most finished clothing.40 If average wages for apparel workers in Vietnam were 
doubled, they would earn the equivalent of $360 monthly. It would increase the 
price of a pair of blue jeans manufactured there by only 2 percent, but it could 
transform the lives of Vietnamese workers and narrow the gap somewhat between 
the cost of production in the United States and abroad.41 And if foreign workers 
had more disposable income, it would create new markets for U.S. products and 
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services, helping to raise wages and employment in the United States as well.
Second, opponents argue that this is an example of the United States im-
posing its standards on other countries. This argument presumes that countries 
such as Malaysia or Vietnam are free to pay workers higher wages but prefer to 
pay their own workers less. This is a false argument. In reality, Vietnam does 
not have the latitude to raise wages or environmental standards because it must 
compete with exports from places like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Haiti, and India 
that pay workers even less.42 If global markets like the United States and the EU 
required all their trade partners to pay fair wages and use sustainable production 
methods as a condition for entering their market tariff-free, then developing 
countries exporting to those markets would have an incentive to improve the 
lives of their citizens without losing their comparative advantage. Rather than 
imposing a standard on developing countries, anti–social dumping duties would 
empower those countries to improve living standards.
A living wage is not a U.S. standard—it is an international standard. Article 
I of the ILO’s 2008 Declaration of Social Justice for Fair Globalization provides 
that states should develop measures of social protection that “are sustainable and 
adapted to national circumstances,” including inter alia, “policies in regards to 
wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work, designed to ensure a 
just share of the fruits of progress to all and a minimum living wage to all em-
ployed and in need of such protection.”43 An anti–social dumping duty would 
go a long way toward achieving a living wage for all nations.
ConClusIon
Free trade is not free. The gains from trade are marginal, and the sunk costs 
of creative destruction can outweigh the near-term gains. Although the global 
economy has generated millions of new jobs in developing economies, these 
countries do not have the regulatory infrastructure to maintain labor, safety, and 
environmental standards. Workers are exploited, and production methods are 
not sustainable. Regulatory competition among developing countries prevents 
them from raising standards, which leads to the problem of social dumping.
An anti–social dumping duty could improve the conditions and livelihood 
of foreign workers and encourage exporting countries to adopt sustainable 
methods of production. At the same time, it would create new markets and 
stimulate world economic growth. Striking a balance between trade liberaliza-
tion, fair labor standards, and sustainability, an anti–social dumping duty can 
serve as a model for other regional free trade agreements. AW
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